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“Tax Havens and Public International Law:
The Case of The Netherlands Antilles*”
By Georges A. Cavalier**
Abstract
This paper identifies changes to tax havens’ legislation as a result of 
pressure from rich countries exercised through the OECD. It focuses on 
the specific situation of the Netherlands Antilles. The paper analyzes the 
response given by the Netherlands Antilles to the international 
community through the modification of its tax agreement with the mother 
country in Europe, and considers whether this is a solution for adoption 
by other tax havens. The paper then argues that such a model is not 
appropriate for use in a small economy which cannot rely on a supportive 
mother country nor on tourism as an alternative resource. The paper 
concludes that the legal status of small island states could be 
reconsidered in public international law and proposes that rich countries 
adopt a balanced approach when considering harmful tax competition.
*
 This paper was originally written in connection with the International Tax Symposium held in the French 
Caribbean – Martinique – on December 4-5, 2003, and entitled “Taxation and Development: International Legal 
Regulation, Tax Systems and Development in the Caribbean.” This meeting was jointly organized by the 
University Jean Moulin, Lyon III (C.E.R.F.F.) and the Guyana and Antilles University (C.R.P.L.C.). All the 
papers delivered at the symposium are also published in French with Cujas Edition, Paris.
**
 University of Geneva. Also Ph.D. candidate with the University Lyon III - Jean Moulin (France) and with the 
Radboud University of Nimegue, Onderzoekcentrum Onderneming & Recht (The Netherlands).  I would like to 
thank Mr. Huub Bierlaagh and Mr. Jan de Goede, senior tax lawyers at the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation in Amsterdam, who very kindly agreed to discuss the subject with me in September 2002. 
Finally, and as importantly, I would like to thank all the people hereafter who commented on an earlier draft of 
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I INTRODUCTION
Any attempt to comment on tax haven legislation exposes the writer to two dangers.  
- The first is the risk of offending those who advocate the status quo with respect to 
tax havens, with the argument that tax competition is good because low tax rates 
have the advantage of attracting corporations and are a source of income for small 
economies.
- The second is the risk of offending their opponents, those who criticize the status 
quo with respect to tax havens, with the view that it is not tax competition, but 
rather tax harmonization which is desirable, because competitive practices in 
taxation can distort the location of capital and services in a manner detrimental to 
the international community as a whole.1
This paper, therefore, advocates a balanced approach to the question of tax havens, 
which are sometimes perceived as true heavens! It concludes that one must simply rethink the 
legal status of tax havens within the international community.  The example of recent changes 
that occurred in the Netherlands Antilles will be the basis for reflection. Along with tourism, 
taxation is indeed the mainstay of this small economy.2  So leaving tourism aside (while 
bearing in mind that a tax haven crisis can affect tourism as well3), the Netherlands Antilles is 
often presented as a leading financial centre offering an attractive regime with low tax rates.  
Many international financial firms have a presence in the Netherlands Antilles, and to a lesser 
extent in Aruba.4
The reason why is because until recently tax rates ranged between 2.4 % to 9.66 %, 
depending on the type of income a company generated.5  These tax rates would make the 
1 Amos C. Peters, Exploring Caribbean Tax Structure and Harmonization Strategies, Bulletin of the 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 2002, May 2002, p. 178 (186).
2
 Followed by petroleum refining and shipping. Almost all consumer and capital goods are imported principally 
from Venezuela, the U.S., and Mexico, because poor soils, and inadequate water supplies (except for Aruba), 
hamper the development of agriculture.
3
 The choice of haven is also, in practice, influenced by considerations of location, even if another tax haven 
situated further from the client offered greater tax advantages (see Rotterdam institute for Fiscal Studies, 
Regional aspects of tax havens, in International Tax Avoidance, Boston/Antwerpen/London/Frankfurt, Kluwer, 
1979, p. 107).
4
 There were 33 offshore banks operating in 2000, originating mainly from the Netherlands and Venezuela.
5
 When deriving their net income out of interest, royalty, dividend, trading, management and consultancy, 
offshore banking, insurance, shipping and aircraft activities: see Netherlands Antilles Profits Tax Ordinance. See 
also Xander R. M. Arts, The Netherlands Antilles New Fiscal Regime and Amended Tax Arrangement for the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands Enter into Force, Intertax 2002, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 153. And when entering into tax 
rulings with the tax inspector, one could often effectively reduce these already low percentages. Also, under 
Dutch law, Dutch corporations were able to transfer their statutory seats to the Netherlands Antilles in certain 
emergency situations, like the wartime German occupation. “Thus the Netherlands Antilles became a pioneer for 
asset protection facilities” (Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
United Kingdom, 2002, p. 157).
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Netherlands Antilles seem a veritable tax “heaven.”  This used to be true, but recently these 
tax rates have been raised to a standard 34.5 %, so it may be asked whether it is still true. 
This paper aims to show why a balanced approach should be advocated when dealing 
with tax havens, even if it satisfies neither of the opposed positions indicated at the outset.  
Indeed, the recent changes in the tax laws of the Netherlands Antilles are a good example of 
how a legislator can both satisfy the international community and preserve a local economy 
largely based on offshore financial and tax services.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands encompasses the Netherlands, the Netherlands 
Antilles, and Aruba6.  The Netherlands (also known as Holland, two of its larger provinces) is 
the part of the Kingdom situated in Europe.  The Netherlands Antilles, then, comprises two 
island groups in the Caribbean Sea.  One group, including Curacao and Bonaire, lies north of 
Venezuela, while the other group, comprising St. Maarten, Saba, and St. Eustatius, lies east of 
the Virgin Islands and north of Martinique.  Of these five islands, Curacao is the largest, 
containing 75% of the approximately 200,000 inhabitants of the islands.  Aruba originally 
formed part of the Netherlands Antilles but acquired a separate status in 1986.  Another 
reason for leaving Aruba aside in this paper is that its offshore industry is much less important 
than that of Curacao, so this paper focuses on the Netherlands Antilles, and deals with Aruba 
only occasionally.
With respect to the relationship between the motherland and its dependent territories, 
the situation is as follows. In theory, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are autonomous as 
regards the management of their affairs, since the mother country in Europe is responsible 
only for foreign affairs, defence, and external economic relations.7  In practice however, the 
Netherlands Antilles, more than Aruba, are very dependent on the European part of the 
Kingdom.8
The introduction proposes a few distinctions with respect to the terms used therein, to 
prepare the reader to the background and substance of these changes in the tax laws of the 
Netherlands Antilles. At the outset this paper refers to the “Netherlands Antilles” as a tax 
“heaven.” It could have used the term “fiscal paradise,” as the French, Spanish or Portuguese 
do, or the German “tax oasis,” terms with much the same flavour, but it will use the English 
expression “tax haven,” much more appealing than “offshore centre” or “low tax 
6 Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1954 Staatsblad 503, as amended.
7
 See C. Kortmann, P. Bovend'Eert, Dutch Constitutional Law, The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law 
International, 2000 (37): the autonomy and equivalent status of these overseas territories vis-à-vis the State in 
Europe is guaranteed by a Charter which is the basis for this federation sui generis.
8
 Idem (40).
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jurisdiction.”9   This paper is using the term “tax haven” in an entirely neutral sense, without 
implying any judgement whatever about the probity of any particular tax regime.10  The term 
simply denotes a fiscally attractive location, a refuge from taxation, a haven in the basic sense 
of the word.
Is the traditional tax evasion/tax avoidance distinction still relevant for our subject?11
In other words, should investing in a tax haven be viewed as tax evasion or tax avoidance?  
Authors usually distinguish tax evasion, which is illegal, from tax avoidance, which is legal12.  
When an individual’s earnings reach the minimum level for income tax and social security 
contributions, he or she can decide to stop working for the rest of the tax year (perfectly legal) 
or continue to work for unreported cash payment (not legal).  But nowadays tax avoidance 
itself sometimes becomes illegal, because most high-tax countries have anti-avoidance laws, 
which prevent both companies and individuals from using tax havens in order to escape their 
national tax obligations.  This was the case, for instance, of the French “exit tax” on 
unrealized capital gains on stock in companies in which an individual has substantial holdings 
as soon as they had left France.13  The aim of such domestic legislation is to prevent people 
from benefiting from tax competition seen as harmful to the community as a whole.14
In addition to these internal measures taken by high-tax countries, multilateral 
organizations like the European Union (EU) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) use political pressure and threats of economic reprisals in order to 
eliminate harmful tax competition.  Even the World Trade Organization has an interest in 
promoting better trade-related tax legislation.  This is exemplified by the recent challenge 
9
 See generally, Thierry Francq, Alain Damais, Comment fonctionnent les centres offshore?, Problèmes 
économiques 2000, no. 2.674 dated July 19, 2000, p. 1; Mykola Orlov, The Concept of Tax Haven: A Legal 
Analysis, Intertax, vol. 32, no 2, 2004, p. 95; see also art. 209 B, French General Tax Code, as amended by art. 
104 of Finance Act for 2005.
10 Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, p. 1.
11
 See generally, Rémi Gouyet, L'illicite et le droit fiscal, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2000; Charles 
Robbez Masson, La notion d'évasion fiscale en droit interne français, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1990. 
12 Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, p. 6. 
But for a more subtle distinction between tax avoidance and tax saving, see Uckmar, General Report, in Tax 
avoidance/Tax evasion, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Boston/Antwerpen/London/Frankfurt, Kluwer, 
1983, vol. LXVIIIa, p. 15 (para. 35).
13
 Former art. 167 bis of the French General Tax Code, repealed by art. 19 of Finance Act for 2005 (Dr. fiscal 
2005, no 1-2, comm. 72); see also: Conseil d'Etat, 14 December, 2001, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant, no
211341, RJF 2/02 no 160, concl. G. Goulard, p. 112); ECJ, 11 March 2004, de Lasteyrie du Saillant, aff. C-9/02, 
RJF 5/04 no 558, chron. L. Olléon, p. 347, Dr. fiscal 2004 no 20, comm. 483, B. Boutemy and E. Meier; Rép. 
Morel-A-L’Huissier, JOAN 21 Sept. 2004, p. 7298; CE, 10 Nov. 2004, no 211341. See generally, Raphaël Coin, 
Les règles anti-évasion fiscale françaises ont-elles un avenir dans un contexte international?, Les Petites 
Affiches 2003, no 196, p. 3; B. Gouthière, L’exit tax déclarée contraire au droit communautaire, FR 21-04, p. 
15; J. Le Calvez, Brèves remarques sur l’ “exit tax” et le droit communautaire, D. 2004, n° 13, p. 933.
14
 For an overview of the situation in the Netherlands, see Johan Barnard, Jacques Overgaauw, Stef van 
Weeghel, Netherlands, in Limits on the use of low-tax regimes by multinational businesses: current measures 
and emerging trends, International Fiscal Association, 2001, vol. LXXXVIb, p. 693.
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before the Appellate Body of the United States of America (U.S.) foreign sales corporation 
tax regime15.
Why, then, does the Netherlands Antilles offer a good example of a coherent response 
to international community pressure directed to eliminating harmful tax competition?  The 
reason is that the Netherlands Antilles response took the form of a move from their favourable 
international tax regime towards a more internationally accepted tax scheme for foreign 
investors.  But it also preserved the interests of the local economy by including a transitional 
period of approximately 20 years.  However, it is uncertain that this example can be followed 
everywhere; after all, it is not easy for a small country economy, with few resources other 
than offshore financial services, to switch to other sources of income just to please other 
(richer) countries.   More fundamentally, the sovereign legal status of small independent 
States within the international community may have to be reconsidered.16
This paper first identifies the pressures for tax changes exercised by rich countries, 
focusing on the specific situation the Netherlands Antilles was facing in the world 
community, and then tries to analyze whether the response given by the Netherlands Antilles 
through, for instance, the modification of its tax agreement with the mother country in Europe 
is a solution for adoption by all other tax havens.
15
 The foreign sales corporation regime has been held contrary to the GATT Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. See generally, Stanley I. Langbein, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Corporation." WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R. WTO Appellate Body, February 24, 2000, Am. J. Comp. L. 2000, 
vol. 94, p. 546, FSC ruling will force major tax reform, Offshore Red March 2002, p. 3; Paul R. McDaniel, The 
Impact of Trade Agreements on Tax Systems, Intertax 2002, vol. 30, no. 5, p. 166 (published earlier in Paul R. 
McDaniel, The Impact of Trade Agreements on Tax Systems, in Festschrift für Klaus Vogel zum 70. Geburtstag, 
Heildelberg, C. F. Müller Verlag, 2000, p. 1105), Carol Doran Klein, Jason Slatter, WTO Releases Arbitration 
Panel Report Granting EU Authority To Impose Import Sanctions, Intertax 2003, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 54. For a 
similar debate in Europe, see Otmar Thömmes, CFC Legislation and EC Law, Intertax 2003, vol. 31, no. 5, p. 
188.
16 Johan Barnard, Jacques Overgaauw, Stef van Weeghel, Netherlands, in Limits on the use of low-tax regimes 
by multinational businesses: current measures and emerging trends, International Fiscal Association, 2001, vol. 
LXXXVIb, p. 693.
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II THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY
Interest in tax havens is not new, but it is increasing.17  And September 11 is only one 
of the factors behind this increase.18  Two interconnected factors are as important as the 
financing of international terrorism: money laundering and harmful tax competition.  Harmful 
tax competition has been the subject of in-depth investigation by various international bodies, 
and in all these investigations the Netherlands Antilles have been included. 
This is because tax regimes like that of the Netherlands Antilles have led to dramatic 
capital inflows to offshore centres.19  However, there has recently been a slowdown, at least 
within the Caribbean jurisdictions.  The offshore sector’s contribution, which was 20% of the 
gross domestic product in 1985, fell to 8% in 2000.20  Financial services in most Caribbean 
jurisdictions have lost significant business in their sector.  As a result, the Netherlands 
Antilles has also experienced a sharp decline in growth since the middle of the last decade.21
A. From Heaven to Hell: The Netherlands Antilles Characterization as a “Tax 
Haven”
Although the following organizations are not the only international bodies pressuring 
for changes,22 the main reason for this economic recession is the “blacklisting” of these 
17
 See Anthony Sanfield Ginsberg, International Tax Havens, Durban, Butterworths, 1997; Mark Hampton, The 
offshore interface: tax havens in the global economy, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996; Timothy Lyons, Huub 
Bierlaagh, Joanna Wheeler, The International Guide to the Taxation of Trusts, Amsterdam, IBFD Publications, 
1998; International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Taxation & Investment in the Caribbean, Amsterdam, 
IBFD Publications, 2000; Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United 
Kingdom, 2002, IBFD, Taxation & Investment in the Caribbean, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2000. More recently, see 
Jacques Malherbe, Harmful Tax Competition and the Future of Financial Centres in the European Union,
Intertax 2002, vol. 30, no. 6-7, p. 219 (published earlier in Jacques Malherbe, Harmful Tax Competition and the 
Future of Financial Centres in the European Union, in Festschrift für Klaus Vogel zum 70. Geburtstag, 
Heildelberg, C. F. Müller Verlag, 2000, p. 1125).
18 Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens?, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 
available on <http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/> 2002, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 389 (415).
19
 This rate of increase is well in excess of the growth of total outbound foreign direct investment. Foreign direct 
investment in these regions increased more than five-fold over the period 1985-1994, to more than USD 200 
billion: see OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, 1998, 80 p. (no. 35). In fact, for every 
percentage point increase in the top corporate tax rates in industrialised countries, capital inflows to offshore 
centres in the Caribbean rose by 19%.  Moreover, a IMF study indicates that offshore financial centres banks' 
cross-border assets and liabilities grew by over 6% annually during 1992-1997 to around USD 5 trillion (FSF, 
Report of the Working Group on Offshore Centres dated April 5, 2000, available on <http://www.fsforum.org>, 
2000, 68 p. (no. 17)).
20 Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, p. 157.
21
 Contrasting with Aruba which is among the highest per capita income economy in the region, the Netherlands 
Antilles have a growth rate, for 2002, of 0.8% (IMF, Country Report no. 03/160 entitled "Kingdom of the 
Netherlands - Netherlands Antilles: 2003 Article IV Consultation - Staff Report"; Public Information Notice on 
the Executive Board Discussion, 35 p., 2003, and IMF, Country Report no. 03/159 entitled "Kingdom of the 
Netherlands - Netherlands Antilles: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix", 45 p., 2003,  no. 1, no. 6).
22
 See the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF"). 
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jurisdictions by the OECD, by the EU, and by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).23  So two 
bodies, the OECD and the FSF were exerting pressure for changes.  Let us look at the FSF 
findings first.
1. The Financial Stability Forum
The FSF,24 which brings together senior representatives of national financial 
authorities and international financial institutions, issued a report on April 2000.25  It 
characterized the Netherlands Antilles as among the most dubious of tax havens, along with,
for instance, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, 
Nauru, Seychelles, or Vanuatu.26  In September 2003 in Paris, the tenth meeting of the FSF 
suggested that the monitoring of the offshore financial centres should be an integral part of the 
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) financial sector surveillance work,27 a suggestion 
repeated a few days later in Dubai.28  The IMF has already published an assessment in 2002 
of the offshore financial situation in Aruba.29  The assessment in the Netherlands Antilles was 
published in February 2004.30
23 Bruce Zagaris, Caribbean Jurisdictions Must "Get Up, Stand Up" Against U.S. Discriminatory Sanctions, Tax 
Notes International 2002, dated August 19, 2002, p. 923.
24
 The FSF is an initiative of the President of the Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer, to create a financial stability 
forum. The treasury departments of the G7 countries approved it (see Les pays riches promettent de tirer 
ensemble la croissance mondiale, La nouvelle République 1999, no. 1042, newspaper dated Feb. 25, 1999, 
available on <http://www.africaonline.co.ci/AfricaOnline/infos/nourep/1042int1.html>). See also: FSF, Who we 
are?, 2003, available on <http://www.fsforum.org/about/who_we_are.html>. But the FSF consists only of G7 
governments, the IMF, the Bank for International Settlements, the OECD and related international bodies (see 
Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, p. 152).
25 FSF, Report of the Working Group on Offshore Centres dated April 5, 2000, available on 
<http://www.fsforum.org>, 2000, 68 p.
26 FTF, Grouping of Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) to Assist in Setting Priorities for Assessment, ref. no.: 
15/2000E, released May 26, 2000, available at <http://www.fsforum.org/publications/PR_OFC00.pdf>; see also 
Le Forum de stabilité financière publie la liste des centre off-shore à problèmes, Les Echos 2000, newspaper 
dated May 26, 2000, available on 
<http://perso.wanadoo.fr/ceric/colloques/pageprogramme/rencontres/documentations/partie...>.
27 FSF, Tenth Meeting of the FSF (Paris, 10 September 2003), 2003, available on <http://www.fsforum.org>.
28 FSF, Statement by Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum, International 
Monetary and Financial Committee Meeting (Dubai, 21 September 2003), 2003, available on 
<http://www.fsforum.org>.
29 IMF, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, Jan Willem van der Vossen, Ross Delston, Gabriella 
Ferencz, Steve Butterworth, Aruba - Offshore Financial Center Assessment, 2002, vol. I & II. In 1995, a 
consulting firm attempted to estimate the economic importance of the offshore sector for Aruba, but due to lack 
of data, it did not come to an authoritative estimate. The economic importance of the approximately 5.000 
offshore entities cannot be established reliably, as they do not prepare or publish financial statements, nor 
information on ownership and activities (IMF, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, Jan Willem van der 
Vossen, Ross Delston, Gabriella Ferencz, Steve Butterworth, Aruba - Offshore Financial Center Assessment, 
2002, vol. I (8)).
30
 IMF, Assessment of the Supervision and Regulation of the Financial Sector, Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
February 2004, 2 vol.
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2. The European Union “Code of Conduct”
In much the same way, the European Union is tackling harmful tax competition 
amongst its Member States.  In 1997, the European Council agreed on a common political 
approach, with a package of tax measures that included a code of conduct (the “Code of 
Conduct”)31 designed to eliminate harmful tax competition in the business taxation area.32
According to the proposed timetable, the phasing out of harmful tax measures will be 
completed by 31 December 2005.33
Apart from setting a date for the termination of the schemes, the Code of Conduct 
requests Member states with dependent and associated territories, such as the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, to ensure that harmful business taxation measures are suppressed in such 
territories.34  Indeed, a working group on harmful tax competition, known as the Primarolo 
Group, identified the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a leader in Europe, with 10 harmful tax 
measures.35
31
 Within the EU, the Primarolo Group (from the name of Dawn Primarolo, then UK paymaster general) 
identified harmful tax practices within the EU.
32 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 Dec. 1997 concerning taxation policy (98/C 2/01), JOCE C 
2/1 dated January 6, 1997, CELEX no. 31998Y01106(01), and see most recently Philippe Cattoir, Matthias 
Mors, Une chronique du paquet fiscal – les fondements et les enjeux de la démarche communautaire, Dr. fisc. 
2005, p. 240; Otmar Thoemmes, Hans van den Hurk, Tax Package Finally Adopted; Substantial Modification of 
Interest and Royalty Directive, Intertax 2003, vol. 31, no. 11, p. 474.
33 Heleen Nijkamp, Landmark agreement on EU tax package: new guidelines stretch scope of EU Code of 
Conduct, EC Tax Review 2001, no. 3, p. 147; the Directive on savings taxation is due to take effect from January 
1, 2005 and that on interest and royalties from Jan. 1, 2004 (European Commission, Taxation: Commission 
Welcomes Adoption of Package to Curb Harmful Tax Competition, IP/03/787, Brussels, June 3, 2003, available 
on <http://europa.eu.int/>, 2003).
34 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning taxation policy (98/C 2/01), 
JOCE C 2/1 dated January 6, 1997, CELEX no. 31998Y01106(01).
35
 See Mrs. Primarolo report: Gerard Meussen, The EU-Fight Against Harmful Tax Competition; Developments 
in Light of the Enlargement of the EU with 10 Candidate Member States, in Tax Policy in EU Candidate 
Countries On the Eve of Enlargement, Symposium of 12-14 September 2003, Riga, Latvia, available on 
<http://www.eurofaculty.lv/taxconference/>, Dawn Primarolo, Report of the Code of Conduct group on business 
taxation (Primarolo Report), available on <http://www.uv.es/cde/TEXTOS/primaloro_en.pdf>, 1999, . The 
Netherlands has already taken measures to suppress some regimes (In his decree of November 20, 2000 (Decree 
of November 20, 2000, no. IFZ2000/1292M, Ruling Policy regarding BV1/BV2-structures, BNB 2001/14), the 
Dutch State Secretary of Finance declared, that in so-called BV1/BV2-structures (structures used by American 
corporations for their foreign acquisitions and reorganizations aimed at gaining certain tax advantages by using 
differences in qualifications of the BV's (transparent versus non-transparent) in the relation the Netherlands 
versus the United States), rulings no longer would be issued and that furthermore, through a change in 
legislation, the Dutch fiscal unity regime would no longer apply to these structures. The policy behind this 
decree was the principle of good faith towards treaty partners and the ongoing international discussion on 
harmful tax competition (see Gerard Meussen, The EU-Fight Against Harmful Tax Competition; Developments 
in Light of the Enlargement of the EU with 10 Candidate Member States, in Tax Policy in EU Candidate 
Countries On the Eve of Enlargement, Symposium of 12-14 September 2003, Riga, Latvia, available on 
<http://www.eurofaculty.lv/taxconference/> (3)). More recently, on March 30, 2001, the Dutch State Secretary 
of Finance issued eight Decrees in which a new policy on Advance Pricing Agreements and Advance Tax 
Rulings was laid down: see Carlo Romano, Advance Tax Rulings and Principles of Law - Towards a European 
Tax Rulings System?, Amsterdam, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2002, Gerard Meussen, Erik 
Velthuizen, APAs and ATRs: The new Dutch regime in a European perspective, EC Tax Review 2002, no. 1, p. 
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The tax package was finally agreed in Luxembourg by ECOFIN36 on June 3, 2003.  As 
it stands, this consists of three measures: the Code of Conduct, a directive concerning the 
taxation of savings income, and a directive on the taxation of interest and royalty payments 
between associated companies.37  As “soft law,” the Code of Conduct is only a political 
commitment agreed upon by the Member States.38
Despite the non-binding nature of the Code of Conduct, certain tax regimes could be 
challenged separately under the EC competition law rules, and more particularly state aid 
rules.39  State aid measures would have far more impact than the non-binding Code of 
Conduct, since they are enforceable by the European Court of Justice.40  However, EC 
competition rules do not apply to the Netherlands Antilles.41  For this reason, the OECD threat 
of economic reprisals is of much greater concern to small economies like the Netherlands 
Antilles because these are the only real and effective measures that could be taken against 
them.
4, and Marja de Best, Rulings : nouvelle politique néerlandaise, Bulletin européen et international 2001, no. 4, p. 
3).
36 The Ecofin Council consists of the ministers of economy and finance of the member states.
37 European Commission, Taxation: Commission Welcomes Adoption of Package to Curb Harmful Tax 
Competition, IP/03/787, Brussels, June 3, 2003, available on <http://europa.eu.int/>, 2003.
38
 See generally, Gérard Farjat, Réflexions sur les codes de conduite privés, in Droit des relations économiques 
internationales : études offertes à Berthold Goldman, Paris, Litec, 1982, p. 47; Pieter Sanders, Codes of conduct 
and sources of law, in Droit des relations économiques internationales : études offertes à Berthold Goldman, 
Paris, Litec, 1982, p. 283, and recently Edwin van der Bruggen, The Power of Persuasion: Notes on the Sources 
of International Law and the OECD Commentary, Intertax 2003, vol. 31, no. 8-9, p. 259.
39
 See Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation 
(98/C, JOCE dated December 10, 1998, no. 384/03). The Commission authorization granted in 1987 and 
extended in 1994 for the arrangements for international financial services centres in Dublin expires in 2005 
(Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning taxation policy (98/C 2/01), 
JOCE C 2/1 dated January 6, 1997, CELEX no. 31998Y01106(01) (no. 3)). The Council has recently agreed 
extensions beyond the end of 2005 of benefits of the following measures would be granted:
- Belgium: Co-ordination Centres, extension to December 31, 2010;
- Ireland: Foreign Income, extension to December 31, 2010;
- Luxembourg: 1929 Holding Companies, extension to December 31, 2010;
- Netherlands: International Financing, extension to December 31, 2010;
- Portugal: Madeira's Fee Economic Zone, extension to December 31, 2011. See Results of Council of 
Economics and Finance Ministers, Brussels, 21 January 2003 - MEMO/03/13, 2003, available on 
<http://europa.eu.int>.
40
 For an interesting argument using art. 96 of the EC treaty as a legal basis to attack tax measures that have been 
identified as harmful under the Code of Conduct, see Francesco Nanetti, Giovanni Mameli, The creeping 
normative role of the EC Commission in the twin-track struggle against State aids and harmful tax competition,
EC Tax Review 2002, no. 4, p. 185 (189); Jan de Goede, European Integration and Tax Law, European Taxation 
2003, vol. 43, no. 6, p. 206, and Gerard Meussen, The EU-Fight Against Harmful Tax Competition; 
Developments in Light of the Enlargement of the EU with 10 Candidate Member States, in Tax Policy in EU 
Candidate Countries On the Eve of Enlargement, Symposium of 12-14 September 2003, Riga, Latvia, available 
on <http://www.eurofaculty.lv/taxconference/> (5).
41
 On the relationship between the Netherlands Antilles and the Community, see art. 182 et seq. of the EC 
Treaty, and recently Peter Oliver, judgments of 22 Nov. 2001, CML Rev. 2002, vol. 39, p. 337.
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B. The OECD Conquest of Paradise: The Threat of Economic Reprisals
Every tax lawyer is aware of the OECD work in the field of tax treaties.  The OECD 
now also provides a framework in which countries can work to eliminate not tax competition 
as such, but only “harmful” tax competition.  Tax competition is not necessarily bad.  And 
this is the view of the U.S., which is a major player.  For instance, Paul O’Neil, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary, stated in May 2001 that “the US does not support efforts to dictate to any country 
what its own tax rates or tax system should be, and will not participate in any initiative to 
harmonize world tax systems.”42  But the question now is: to what extent is this competition 
permissible?  It seems that the OECD Members are open to competition as long as it is 
transparent and non-discriminatory.43   The OECD position expressed in a report issued in 
1998 will be presented before dealing with the Netherlands Antilles response to such OECD 
appraisal.
1. The 1998 Report
In 1998, the OECD established an international framework to counter the spread of 
harmful tax competition by adopting a report (the 1998 Report).44  It defines the factors to be 
used in identifying harmful tax practices.  The key features of harmful preferential tax 
regimes are (i) no or low effective tax rates, (ii) lack of transparency, (iii) lack of effective 
exchange of information, and (iv) "ring-fencing" of regimes.45  “Ring-fencing” refers to the 
situation where preferential tax regimes are insulated from the domestic markets of the 
country providing the regime, for example, by excluding resident taxpayers from taking 
advantage of its benefits, or prohibiting enterprises, which benefit from the preferential 
regime from operating in the domestic market.  The very fact that a country feels the need to 
protect its own economy from the regime by ring-fencing is a strong indication that the 
regime has the potential to create harmful effects.46
42 Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, p. 153, 
and Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens?, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 
available on <http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/> 2002, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 389 (412). It is the 
Clinton administration that really pushed for the OECD to “handle” tax havens. This is not any more the case 
with the Bush/O’Neil administration, although this changed after September, 11 in the sense that tax havens need 
to disclose as much information as possible in order to determine whether funds are used to finance terrorism.
43 R. Hammer, J. Owens, Promoting Tax Competition, OECD publication available on 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/11/1915964.pdf> 2002.
44 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, 1998, 80 p.
45 Idem (26). However, the “ring-fencing” criteria has been dropped, because what is most important for the 
OECD is the transparency and the exchange of information.
46 Idem (27). In the Netherlands Antilles, the tax revenue for 2002 on income and profits is 11.1 % of the GDP, 
of which 2.5% is offshore (see IMF, Country Report no. 03/160 entitled "Kingdom of the Netherlands -
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The Ministerial Council of OECD instructed its Committee on Fiscal Affairs to 
produce, from the number of jurisdictions meeting the tax haven criteria, a list of those which 
were uncooperative (“List of Uncooperative Tax Havens”), to be completed by 31 July 2001.  
In 2000, the OECD published a preliminary list of the jurisdictions that were found to meet 
the tax haven criteria of the 1998 Report.47  Cited among these jurisdictions are Aruba and the 
Netherlands Antilles.48  What risks did the Netherlands Antilles face if it had maintained its 
existing old tax regime?
In this case, the OECD allowed its members to take defensive measures either under 
domestic legislation or under tax treaties, such as, for instance, (i) disallowing tax deductions, 
(ii) disallowing tax exemptions, (iii) disallowing tax credits, or other allowances related to 
transactions with Uncooperative Tax Havens.  The economic reprisals could also have taken 
the form of a "transactional" charge.  These levies would have been imposed on certain 
transactions involving Uncooperative Tax Havens.49  Of course, the legality of these 
defensive measures, which fall within the scope of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, has been questioned in light of public international economic law.50  And the OECD 
timetable has also been recently undermined by the EU by permitting some of its own 
members (who are also OECD members) to avoid tax information exchange until 2010 at the 
earliest.51  But the Netherlands Antilles took seriously this threat.
Netherlands Antilles: 2003 Article IV Consultation - Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive 
Board Discussion, 35 p., 2003, p. 29).
47 OECD, 2000 Report: Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful 
Tax Practices, available on<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf>, 2000, 30 p. (no. 17); see also 
Francis Lefebvre, Liste des paradis fiscaux de l'OCDE, Bulletin européen et international 2000, no. 4, p. 23.
48
 The critical remarks which were made to the Netherlands Antilles tax laws can be summarized as follows: (i) 
there were no legal mechanisms that allow tax information to be exchanged with other tax authorities upon 
request, (ii) beneficial ownership information was not available to the public, and (iii) there were restrictions on 
the ability of the Netherlands Antilles entities to do business on the preferential tax terms in the Netherlands 
Antilles.   See OECD, 2000 Report: Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices, available on<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf>, 2000, 30 p (17).
49 Idem (no. 35).
50
 In favour of the legality: Jakob B. Gross, OECD Defensive Measures against Harmful Tax Competition 
Legality under WTO, Intertax 2003, vol. 31, no. 11, p. 390 (395); for a preliminary analysis of possible claims: 
Stephen J. Orava, Potential WTO Claims in Response to Countermeasures under the OECD's Recommendations 
Applicable to Alleged Tax Havens, available on <www.ito.org>, 2001, 17 p. See also, Romain Grynberg, 
Bridget Chilala, WTO Compatibility of the OECD "Defensive Measures" against "Harmful Tax Competition" 
available on <http://www.thecommonwealth.org>, The Journal of World Investment, 2001, and OECD, Project 
on Harmful Tax Pracices: The 2001 Progress Report, available on <http://www.oecd.org>, 2001, p. 9.
51 Richard J. Haye, A Level Playing Field for Tax Information Exchange?, Tax Planning International Review 
2003, p. 1 (5), International Trade and Investment Organisation, EU Concessions Threaten OECD Tax 
Timetable, available on <http://www.itio.org>, 2003; Andrew Parker, OECD Tax Plan Faces Collapse,
Financial Times (European edition) dated October 10, 2003, front page, also available on <http://www.itio.org>.
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2. The Netherlands Antilles Response
Indeed, it remains true that if the Netherlands Antilles did not make a commitment to 
eliminate harmful tax practices by 31 July 2001, it would have been automatically included in 
the List of Uncooperative Tax Havens, subject to possible economic reprisals and suffering a 
major loss of confidence on the part of its international clients.  The Netherlands Antilles 
Minister of Finance therefore wrote a letter to the OECD Secretary General on behalf of the 
government of the Netherlands Antilles committing his country to eliminating tax practices 
determined to be harmful.52  The Netherlands Antilles responded by deciding to change its tax 
framework. To achieve that, it also needed to amend its relationship with the mother country 
in Europe.
III THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND THE KINGDOM
Pursuant to its commitment to the OECD, the Netherlands Antilles have taken several 
measures.  This paper describes only the major tax measures, bearing in mind how the 
Netherlands Antilles fit into the international tax system.
In the post-war years, the advantages of important tax treaties between the Netherlands 
and the U.S. and the United Kingdom were extended to include the Netherlands Antilles.53  At 
present, however, the Netherlands Antilles has a “tax treaty” with the Netherlands, known as 
the Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom (TAK)54.  The Netherlands Antilles also has a tax 
treaty with Norway, but that is all; all the other tax treaties were terminated, because some 
third-country residents had abused the treaties to reduce withholding taxes on investments in 
52
 See letter dated November 30, 2000, from Mr. W.R. Vogos, Minister of Finance, for and on behalf of the 
Government of the Netherlands Antilles to  Mr. Donald Johnson, Secretary General of the OECD, available at 
<www.oecd.org>.
53 Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, p. 157; 
see generally, Marshall J. Langer, The Outrageous History of Caribbean Tax Treaties With OECD Member 
States, Tax Notes International 2002, p. 1205.
54
 See generally Rijkswet van 28 Oktober 1964, houdende Belastingregeling voor het Koninkrijk - history: 
Staatsblad 28 Oktober 1964, no. 425, Staatsblad 1996, no. 664, and Staatsblad 2001, no. 647 (an unofficial 
English translation is available on <http://oneline.ibfd.org>; S. R. Pancham, Op weg naar een Nieuw Fiscaal 
Raamwerk, International Belasting Bulletin 1999, no. 3, p. 15; Lowtax.net, Netherlands Antilles Double Tax 
Agreement, 2003, available on <www.lowtax.net>). Also, on August 3, 2001 the National Ordinance on the 
Supervision of Fiduciary Business was passed in the Netherlands Antilles: see Alma M. Heide, Netherlands 
Antilles, The OFC Report 2002, p. 132. The Dutch parliament, on its part, adopted the amendment to the TAK 
on December 2001 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Update on Fiscal Developments and Possibilities in the 
Netherlands Antilles And Aruba, 40 p., February 7, 2002, p. 15-16). See generally, New Fiscal Framework for 
Netherlands Antilles, Offshore Red 2000, p. 228, Netherlands Antilles, Offshore Red 2001, p. 187. For the 
implementation of the NFF in Aruba, see J. P. Ruiter, A. T. Snijders, Beschrijving van het Nieuw Fiscaal 
Raamwerk in Aruba, Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 6532, dated June 4 2003, p. 923. Although the TAK follows the 
lines of a treaty, from a public international law perspective, it is domestic legislation.
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OECD countries.55  By contrast, the mother country in Europe has of course concluded many 
tax treaties, but the Netherlands Antilles are excluded from their scope.  This is the case, for 
instance, of the France-Netherlands and the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaties.56  However, the 
U.S. has recently entered into an exchange of information agreement with the Netherlands in 
respect of the Netherlands Antilles, which shows that new treaties with important trading 
partners are now under consideration.57  The Netherlands Antilles are currently negotiating 
tax treaties with the U.S., Venezuela, Spain and a few other countries.58
A. The New Fiscal Framework
1. The OECD Friendly Measures: Paradise Lost?
At the end of 2001, the Netherlands Antilles' Parliament adopted two important pieces 
of legislation: (i) the New Fiscal Framework59 ("NFF"), and (ii) the law ratifying the 
amendments to the TAK.  The NFF and the TAK both entered into force on 1st January 
2002.60  It ended the period of uncertainty for clients resulting from international pressure, 
bearing in mind that clients are indeed ready to pay a little bit more for any gain in certainty 
and predictability.
55
 See generally, Marshall J. Langer, The Outrageous History of Caribbean Tax Treaties With OECD Member 
States, Tax Notes International 2002, p. 1205 (1210). The tax treaty with Norway has been revised. In June 1987 
the U.S. Government abruptly withdrawed the extension of the U.S.-Netherlands treaty to the Netherlands 
Antilles (Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, 
p. 161). But art. 8 of the treaty with the U.S. remains in effect (it governs the treatment of withholding tax on 
interest on certain specific loans by Netherlands Antilles corporations to U.S.-resident corporations, and it 
applies only to interest on certain Eurobonds), see IBFD, General, in Taxation & Investment in the Caribbean, 
IBFD, 2003, binder 1, para. 7.2.1. But Netherlands Antilles fully terminated its treaties with Denmark and the 
United Kingdom. The Central Bank of the Netherlands Antilles announces that negotiations on tax treaties with 
Venezuela, Mexico, Spain, Italy, and the United States (the 1986 new treaty with the U.S. has never been ratified 
by that country) have started or will begin soon (see Central Bank of the Netherlands Antilles, Annual Report, 
2003, available on <http://www.centralbank.an>; IBFD, General, in Taxation & Investment in the Caribbean, 
IBFD, 2003, binder 1, para. 7.2.1).
56 France-Netherlands Tax Treaty dated March 16, 1973, JORF dated Dec. 27, 1973 (art. 3.1.b)); see also 
U.S./Netherlands Tax Treaty, dated Dec. 19, 1992 (art. 3.1.b)), and Maarten van der Wijden, The New Protocol 
to the Netherlands-United States Tax Treaty, Bull. Int’l Bur. Fisc. Doc. 2004, p. 304.
57 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands in Respect of the Netherlands Antilles for the Exchange of Information with Respect to Taxes, 
dated April 17, 2002, available on <http://usinfo.state/gov>; see also, Michael Molenaars, Exchange of 
information under the Netherlands-US Income Tax Treaty, Tax Notes International 1999, vol. 18, no. 17, p. 
1713, and IBFD, Annual Report, 2002-2003, 134 p. (52).
58 Personal conversation with Hans Klaver, on Nov. 17, 2003, Amsterdam.
59 Landsverordening van de 29 ste december 1999 tot wijziging van de Landsverrordening op de Winstbelasting 
1940 (P. B. 1965, no. 58). The law was first adopted on December 29, 1999. But because it became clear that the 
negotiations with the Dutch government regarding the amendments to the TAK (see infra) would take longer 
than expected, the law was finally dated December 19, 2001. See generally, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Update 
on Fiscal Developments and Possibilities in the Netherlands Antilles And Aruba, 40 p., February 7, 2002; A. H. 
Schaapman, Het Nieuw Fiscaal Raamwerk van de Nederlandse Antillen, Tijdschrift voor Antilliaans Recht 2002, 
and IBFD, General, in Taxation & Investment in the Caribbean, IBFD, 2003, binder 1, para. 6.
60 Netherlands Antilles, Offshore Red 2002, p. 238.
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The NFF comprises three laws, the most important being the law on corporate income 
tax.  The highlights of the NFF are first, the introduction of a uniform corporate tax regime 
with a standard profits tax rate of 34.5 %, and secondly, a broad participation exemption 
regime,61 which looks very much like the French participation exemption regime.62 The 
meaning of “uniform” corporate tax regime is that the NFF abolishes the previous distinction 
between offshore and onshore tax regimes, so that it could no longer be characterized as a 
“ring-fencing” regime.63
To understand fully the amendments to the TAK and their impact, the prior situation 
must be understood.  Before the amendments, withholding tax on dividends paid to corporate 
shareholders established in the Netherlands Antilles and holding at least 25% of the shares in 
the Dutch subsidiary paying the dividend could be reduced from 15% to 7.5%, or to 5% if the 
dividend recipient was subject to a profit tax rate of at least 5.5%.64  As the old profit tax rate 
in the Netherlands Antilles ranged between 2.4% and 3%, this meant that the Dutch 
withholding tax on dividends was, in practice, reduced to 7.5%. Therefore, the total tax 
burden on such inter-corporate dividends ranged between 9.7% and 10.3% approximately.
The amendments of the dividend withholding tax article have the effect that dividends 
paid by a Dutch company to a Netherlands Antilles company are subject to Dutch dividend 
withholding tax at a rate of 8.3%, provided that at least 25% of the paid-in share capital (or 
voting rights) in the Dutch company are held by the Netherlands Antilles company.  With 
respect to conduit dividends flowing through the Dutch B.V., a further tax credit of 
approximately 3% may be available.65  In the event that the 25% condition is not fulfilled, the 
Dutch dividend withholding tax rate increases to 15%.66
61
 Under the participation exemption regime, gains or profits made from foreign participations are exempted for 
95 %.  The remaining 5 % is taxed according to the uniform charge of 34.5 % (the effective charge therefore 
amounts to about 1.7 %). The exemption is applicable if the taxpayer is a shareholder accounting for at least 5 % 
of the paid in capital or of the voting rights, and If the possession of shares is less than 5 %, then it may be 
regarded as a qualifying participation providing the cost price of the shares amount to more than ANG 1,000,000 
(approximately 650,000 euros): see PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Update on Fiscal Developments and Possibilities 
in the Netherlands Antilles And Aruba, 40 p., February 7, 2002,  (6).
62
 See art. 145 and 216 of the French General Tax Code, as modified by law no. 99-1172 dated December 30, 
1999, JORF dated December 31, 1999, and by law no. 2002-1575 dated December 30, 2002, JORF dated 
December 31, 2002.
63
 See Willem G. Kuiper, New Fiscal Regime for the Netherlands Antilles - The Return of a Tax Haven,
Shoreliner.com 2002, no. 9. 
64
 See Art. 11(3) of the Rijkswet van 28 Oktober 1964, houdende Belastingregeling voor het Koninkrijk -
history: Staatsblad 28 Oktober 1964, no. 425, Staatsblad 1996, no. 664, and Staatsblad 2001, no. 647 (an 
unofficial English translation is available on <http://oneline.ibfd.org>. See generally PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
Update on Fiscal Developments and Possibilities in the Netherlands Antilles And Aruba, 40 p., February 7, 
2002,  (15-16).
65 Wet op de dividendbelasting 1965 (Dutch Dividend Withholding Tax Act), art. 11.
66 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Update on Fiscal Developments and Possibilities in the Netherlands Antilles And 
Aruba, 40 p., Feb. 7, 2002,  (15-16).
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To summarize, this amendment to the TAK, which applies only to dividends paid from 
the Netherlands to the Netherlands Antilles, provides that in most cases the effective tax 
burden will be lower than it was under the old arrangement.  Tax is first levied in the 
Netherlands at source, and the subsequent dividend is entirely exempted in the Netherlands 
Antilles.67  The entire amount withheld in the Netherlands is then paid back by the Dutch 
government to the Netherlands Antilles.68  However, the NFF does not entirely abolish the old 
tax provisions: the NFF succeeded in preserving its very competitive tax rate of 2.4-3% for 
existing companies, but only until 2019. This is known as the “exception clause,” or as the 
“transitional arrangement.”
2. A Transitional Period up to 2019: Paradise Postponed
The transitional arrangement for offshore companies has to be discussed because it is 
of great practical interest.  In the transitional period up to and including the year 2019,69
existing offshore companies will be granted the benefits of the old offshore regime, provided 
certain requirements are met.  This implies that the previous 2.4-3% tax rates, for these 
companies, are guaranteed up to and including the year 2019.70  Similarly, the new rules, 
which alone are designed to comply with international standards regarding transparency and 
ring-fencing, are inapplicable to taxpayers that have elected to remain subject to the old 
offshore regime under the transitional rules.71  In addition to the transitional period, the NFF 
has created attractive new vehicles with the aim of securing financial business after the 
transitional period has expired.72  There has been no official reaction from the OECD as of 
today.  However, informal discussions with OECD senior representatives reveal that the 
OECD is happy with the changes that occurred in the Netherlands Antilles.
B. The Impact on the Local Economy
Since it is not expected that these tax changes will have an adverse impact on the local 
economy, one must ask whether such an apparently successful change could be adopted 
elsewhere.
67 Idem (16).
68 Idem.
69
 The Guarantee Ordinance of 1993 provides a guarantee that the reduced taxation regime for the offshore sector 
will be applicable until the year 2019: IBFD, General, in Taxation & Investment in the Caribbean, IBFD, 2003, 
binder 1, para. 6.
70 Willem G. Kuiper, New Fiscal Regime for the Netherlands Antilles - The Return of a Tax Haven,
Shoreliner.com 2002, no. 9.
71 See generally, Rob. F. Havenga, New Ruling Policy in the Netherlands Antilles, Intertax 2003, vol. 31, no. 2, 
p. 87.
72
 The exempted Private Limited Companies (“NA B.V.”) can opt for a 0% tax charge.
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1. A Limited Impact
The OECD has not been totally indifferent to the impact of the changes it requests on 
the local economy.73  Although it is very clear that precise and reliable data on the economic 
impact are difficult to collect,74 it seems that offshore financial centres contribute some 8% to 
10% of the GDP of tax havens.75  In the Netherlands Antilles, approximately 8,000 persons 
work, directly or indirectly, in the offshore services industry. Since the population is less than 
200,000 people, that accounts for around 10% of the active population.76  Surprisingly, the 
Netherlands Antilles Parliamentary debates prior to the vote on the NFF do not reveal any in 
depth discussion on the impact of tax measures on the local economy.77  On the contrary, it 
expresses the confidence of the Netherlands Antilles government that the adoption of 
internationally accepted standards will create more income to the economy.78  And that 
prediction happens to be sound; it seems that the offshore sector has already begun to recover 
following the implementation of the NFF.79
2. The Specificity of the Netherlands Antilles Case
One should not forget that the Netherlands Antilles are in a special and privileged 
situation: if economic problems arose because of the NFF regime, they would be in a position 
to call for help from their mother country in Europe.  This is probably one of the reasons why, 
after a referendum held in November 1993, the people of the Netherlands Antilles voted to 
continue their union with their mother country.80
But what about the Republic of Nauru, the Pacific island nation which Australia is 
using as a holding station for unwanted asylum seekers?  Sure, it could be said that Nauru’s 
73 Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, p. 151. 
The OECD has held various meetings with various countries to achieve global cooperation (For a description of 
these meetings, see Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens?, Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review, available on <http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/> 2002, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 389).
74 IMF, Country Report no. 03/160 entitled "Kingdom of the Netherlands - Netherlands Antilles: 2003 Article IV 
Consultation - Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion, 35 p., 2003,  (33, 
“Appendix II - Kingdom of the Netherlands – Netherlands Antilles: Statistical Issues”).
75 Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens?, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 
available on <http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/> 2002, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 389 (402).
76 Politieke besluiteloosheid ondermijnt offshore-industrie ("Political Indecisiveness Undermines the Offshore 
Industry"), summary of a Press Conference in Willemstad, Curacaom available in the Library of the IBFD, 
Amsterdam, and on file with author. In 1988, the percentage of the economically active population was 38.4% of 
total population, that is 72,906 persons (Atlapedia online, Countries AtoZ, available on 
<http://www.atlapedia.com/online/countries/nethanti.htm> 2003, Netherlands Antilles).
77 Statenstukken 1999-2000 no. 2313, memorie van toelichting (explanatory memorandum), para. 1, section 1.2.
78 Idem.
79 IMF, Country Report no. 03/160 entitled "Kingdom of the Netherlands - Netherlands Antilles: 2003 Article IV 
Consultation - Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion, 35 p., 2003,  (no. 2, 
no. 7).
80 Caroline Doggart, Tax havens and their uses, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 2002, p. 156.
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one and only onshore bank – the Bank of Nauru, which has effectively been insolvent for 
years – is not too concerned about the U.S. Treasury threats.81  Indeed, for a long time 
international banks have ceased to deal with it!82  Could we also say that OECD pressures 
over these small economies reflect “neo-colonial attitudes” by rich countries?83  One reason 
for such belief is that since these countries are in economic decline, they will be unable to 
survive without the income generated from their offshore banking fees,84 and as tourism is not 
a viable or sufficient option, the only alternative source of income is to develop another kind 
of service industry, such as the financial services industry.85
It is true also that Nauru settled its 1989 famous case with the Commonwealth of 
Australia and obtained a few dollars in damages,86 but we are all aware of the adverse effect 
of declining phosphate reserves on the local economy of Nauru, and it is far from certain that 
Australia will be willing to help Nauru financially, if Nauru was moving towards more 
internationally accepted standards.  Nevertheless, Nauru has moved that direction on 
December 3, 2003, hoping in the meantime that “OECD Member countries and other 
international organisations [will] take these adverse revenue effects [over the small economy 
of Nauru] into account in determining the development assistance they provide.”87  One 
American author has written extensively about harmful tax competition, focusing on the 
Caribbean jurisdictions and the U.S. sanctions.88  It is not obvious that one should condemn 
such exhortations to Caribbean jurisdictions to “Get up and stand up” against possible 
discriminatory sanctions.89  The view here is that a fundamental reconsideration of the legal 
status of these sovereign tiny Island States can not be avoided.90
81
 To seal Nauru off from the American financial system.
82 Sean Dorney, Nauru debts, Newspaper The World Today, dated May 5, 2003, available on 
<http://www.abc.net.au>.
83
 As stated by Vanuatu’s Finance Minister (see Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens?, Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review, available on <http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/> 
2002, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 389 (415)).
84 Idem (415).
85
 E-commerce and high-tech industry are another option. The Netherlands Antilles for instance has approved a 
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IV CONCLUSION
After this short review of “Taxation in the Netherlands Antilles”, one might ask 
whether the days of tax havens are numbered91.  But given the economic impact of 
suppressing tax havens in some poor economies like Nauru or Vanuatu, can one not 
sympathise a little with those wishing “Long life to tax havens!”?  A moderate solution has to 
be proposed: it is only after balancing the costs and profits of suppressing a particular 
attractive tax regime that a jurisdiction will be willing to adopt OECD-friendly measures.  The 
Netherlands Antilles example is one example.  Malta could be another.   While a candidate for 
entry into the EU, Malta had probably recognised that it may be more profitable, in the long 
run, to belong to the EU than to preserve tax and financial regimes objected to by the 
international financial community.92
The long-term solution is to completely rethink the legal status of these small Island 
States.93  Is full sovereignty meaningful when economic independence is unavailable?  The 
economy of these Island States is so dependent on one or two larger nations, that one can 
wonder whether these states should not be simply “annexed,” with Curacao becoming an 
integral part of either the Netherlands or Venezuela, with a special legal status maintaining its 
identity like the French overseas territories.  Of course, the word “annex” is not used in its 
historical meaning in public international law; it just means that large nations have particular 
responsibilities towards these States and that they should reconsider their relationship with 
them.
In any case, a balanced approach is necessary to ensure both an effective fight against 
harmful tax competition, and respect for legitimate tax policies of sovereign nations and 
international legal obligations alike94.  This is one aspect of the passionate debate over the 
Netherlands Antilles in particular, and tax havens in general.  Hopefully, this paper has 
revealed the storm initiated by the OECD over these “deserted” economies, through the 
example of the Netherlands Antilles.  But, as is said by people in the Principality of 
Liechtenstein, isn’t it only where there are deserts that tax oasis can exist at all?95
Longman, 1996, Vol. I/Introduction and Part 1, 554 p. (121)). On micro-states, see also Nguyen Quoc Dinh, 
Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, Droit international public, 6th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J., 1999, 1455 p. (no. 278).
91 Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens?, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 
available on <http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/> 2002, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 389.
92 Malta, Offshore Red 1999, p. 7. Malta is now a member of the EU.
93 Personal conversation with A. (Teun) V. M. Struycken, on Nov. 13, 2003, Nimegue.
94
 United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945, art. 2.1.
95
 “Steueroasen können nur existieren, wo es Steuerwüsten gibt,” (“tax oasis can only exist where there are 
deserts”) cited by Jakob B. Gross, OECD Defensive Measures against Harmful Tax Competition Legality under 
WTO, Intertax 2003, vol. 31, no. 11, p. 390 (400).
